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In May, 1979.* a newspaper article reported that the American
Civil Liberties Union might sue to challenge the United States
Army's decision to close twenty-two combat or combat-related
jobs to women Qlef . l] . This thesis attempts to explore the
psychological, social and attitudinal variables involved in
ground combat and their possible implications for women.
As long as differences between societies are settled by
warfare, the need for strong armed forces will remain. Strong
armed forces, especially ground forces, require a large number
of trained personnel to fill out the ranks. During World War II,
one of the critical shortages that came up was a shortage of
infantry replacements [Ref. 2} . That shortage was relieved by
transferring men from less critical billets to the infantry.
The U.S. Army currently faces some manpower shortages (such as
in reserve units) Qlef. Q. This time, the Army, as well as the
other armed forces, has turned to women as an answer to the
shortage of men.
However, one of the primary tasks of the ground forces is
ground combat, and women are prohibited from serving as combat
infantry in the United States. Women have regularly served the
U.S. Armed Forces, especially in wartime, but rarely as combatants.
In fact, world history provides few instances of female warriors
as compared to the overwhelming use of male combatants [jFtef. 3].
Before the time of universal physical examination, a woman
could disguise herself as a man and thereby join an armed force.

This use was often successful for a surprisingly long time
Qlef. 4J . One outstanding example was Lucy Brewer of the United
States Marine Corps. She was a prostitute in Boston in 1812,
who was working off a debt to her madam in a brothel. She excaped
by dressing as a man and enlisting as a United States Marine under
the name of George Baker. She was assigned to the U.S.So Consti-
tution where she fought as a marksman in the rigging for three
years. During those years, the U.S.S. Constitution was in several
major actions including the famous battle with the H.M.S. Guerriere.
She escaped detection during that time and finally returned home
to her parents and wrote her memoirs Qtef. y.
Several other such cases are known to exist and many more are
suspected [Ref. ^. Some women such as Mary Hays (Molly Pitcher)
fought openly as women. In more recent times, women have borne
arms as guerrillas. The outstanding documented examples are of
women in Soviet partisan units and in the French Resistance
Movement [_Refs. 4, 5/. Women as individuals have performed well
under fire. It has been estimated that 100,000 women fought in
WW II in irregular units Qtef. 6*J.
Great care however should be taken in generalizing these
accounts to all women. The women who fought were in all likeli-
hood a very select portion of the population. They were highly
motivated by personal circumstances or the desperation of the
national situation. It should be noted that, in comparison to
men, women were virtually absent from the battlefield, regardless
of the situation. Unfortunately, accurate data about exact
numbers do not exist.
10

There have been several all-woman infantry units formed.
For instance, the King of Siam's Guards and the female warriors
of the King of Dahomy. The Siam females never participated in
combat, but the Dahomy females did and were renowned in Africa
as infantry soldiers. In the mid l800's, the King of Dahomy
recruited and trained many thousands of young women in order to
shame the male warriors. The female warriors faced regular
British and French troops in battle and earned a reputation as
formidable soldiers. In 1851, between 6,000 and 10,000 of the
Dahomy warriors took part in a battle for the fortified town of
Abeokuta. The attack failed after a fearsome battle. Only
1,200 women survived the battle which reduced Dahomy to a minor
power plef. 4j.
The Soviet Union has probably had the most experience with
female combatants in the 20th century. A female battalion was
raised during the First World War. It later broke and fled at
the onset of the Bolshevek Revolution Qlef. IJ . During the same
revolution, a female company was credited with saving a male
regiment. Women also fought alongside men as machinegunners,
riflewomen and as irregular forces Qtef. 5jf . However, World War
II saw large scale use of women warriors in the Soviet Union.
Women carried raachineguns, volunteered as snipers, flew fighters
and bombers, drove tanks and fought as partisans £Ref. 5y . In
comparison, women in the U.S. Army in World War II served primarily




Contrary to popular opinion, the Israeli experience with
women in combat has been minimal. During the 19^7-19^-8 wars,
some women were wounded or killed defending settlements [Ref. 3].
However, Israeli women have not been combatants since then. Women
hold jobs as clerks, nurses and drivers, but not combatants. The
stirring pictures of young Israeli women holding sub-ma chineguns
or marching smartly down streets seem to be more propaganda than
a display of female martial prowess [Ref. 9J.
s The question of the combat effectiveness of women still remains
to be answered. A possible answer could come from comparing men
and women using those human characteristics, e.g., aggressiveness,
strength, etc., that probably affect performance in ground combat.
Unfortunately, no one is sure how these human variables affect
combat outcomes. An example of this is aggressiveness. In some
cases, as in the Japanese Banzai charges of World War II, aggres-
siveness proved suicidal and tactically unsound. Also, human
attributes are notoriously hard to measure and disagreement exists
on exactly how men and women differ on certain traits. While
there Is strong evidence that men are mere aggressive than women,
for example, there does not seem to be any wholly satisfactory
scale of aggressiveness with which people can be measured £Ref.
10, iff.
The importance of the human element in combat cannot be
questioned. However, much more military combat effectiveness
research has been done on hardware than personnel. Without
trained human beings who willingly risk their lives, the most
advanced battlefield weapons are just so much steel, copper and
12

aluminum -- as the Egyptians so painfully learned in their con-
frontations with the Israelis. Thus, it is probably safe to say
that the human element is at least as important as hardware to
combat effectiveness, if not more so.
Several studies have been done linking human characteristics
with good and poor male combat performance. This thesis attempted
to extend these studies to women. While not definitive, the data
suggest that, in general, women may not be as suitable as men for
ground combat jobs. There is no doubt that some women have
performed well in combat. If the armed forces were seeking a
small number of women for ground combat units, such women could
probably be found. Human variability is such that some women
(men) can be found who surpass the majority of men (women) on
almost any measurable human characteristic [kefs. 12, 13J . The
problem remains, however, of determining the human characteris-
tics important for satisfactory performance in ground combat.
13

II. COMBAT AND THE ROLE OF COMBAT MODELS
A. NATURE OF COMBAT
After WW II, it was very popular to proclaim the age of Pax
Americanus. The United States possessed the long range B-36
bomber and the atomic bomb. War, it was said, was no longer
possible when the U.S. could impose its will over any other
nation by threat of nuclear holocaust [Ref . 2j . Push-button
wars were at hand. World events have proved that push-button
warfare was a myth.
Modern warfare has placed great emphasis on mechanization,
armored forces, and aircraft. The concept of push-button warfare
has been disguised as machinery. As women can push buttons, so
can they ride in armored personnel carriers, drive tanks and fly
airplanes. So, it is argued, women can fight modern wars as
well as men.
Several years ago, during training at the Basic School,
newly commissioned Marine officers were told the following story:
During movement to contact with the enemy, we first take the
enemy under fire with bombers and long-range artillery. As we
get closer, we open up with medium and light artillery as well
as close air support. Soon, we fire with 8lmm mortars, tanks
and recoilless rifles. Before we assault the enemy position, we
set up a base of fire with machine guns and small arras. Then we
close with the enemy using fire and movement and finally we will
get close enough to get on line and assault his position, firing
14

It has been a fact of military life that a well dug in
enemy has been nearly impervious to conventional firepower.
The Marines learned at Tarawa, and thereafter, that intense
bombardment by air and naval gunfire was not nearly sufficient
to destroy the enemy forces [Ref. 1*0. Throughout the entire
island hopping campaign of WW II, the enemy had to be blasted
and burned out of each defensive position by infantrymen. More
recently, in Korea and Vietnam, the enemy went underground to
neutralize the U.S. superiority in firepower. In Vietnam, the
enemy used concealment and dispersion as well. Infantry was
required to find, fix and destroy the enemy.
Machinery has greatly Increased the violence of the modern
battlefield, but it is unlikely to replace infantry. Col. T. N.
Dupuy [Ref. 15] has documented several trends In warfare that
illustrate this point. First, the lethality and power of weapons
has grown enormously from antiquity to the present day. Second,
"The Incidence of casualties on the battlefield has declined as
steadily as the power of weapons has grown" (see Table I). He
explains this apparent paradox by pointing out that troop dis-
persion has increased even faster than weapon power has increased
(see Table II). The steadily Increasing power and accuracy of
conventional weapons has made any concentration of men and materiel
extremely vulnerable to opposing weapons. Thus armored personnel
carriers (APC's), tanks, trucks and aircraft are vulnerable, but
the individual soldier may be less vulnerable because he is not
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a lucerative target for guided missiles. He also can take
advantage of cover and concealment much more easily than can a
50,000 pound tank. As the violence of modern weapons increases,
troops and equipment will probably be further dispersed.
Modern infantry consists of several different types. There
is mechanized infantry, airborne infantry, airmobile infantry
and "straight leg" infantry. Mechanized infantry rides into
battle on APG's. Airborne infantry rides into battle on air-
planes and jumps out when close to their objective. Airmobile
infantry rides to war on helicopters. Straight leg infantry uses
whatever mobility is at hand, and marchs into battle if necessary.
It should be noted, however, that in very few cases do infantry
fight from their vehicles. In most cases, they ride close to
their objective, dismount and fight on foot. In a defensive
situation, all Infantry fight on foot from covered positions.
Mechanization has increased the mobility of modern infantry, but
actual combat is still done on foot the old fashioned way.
Precluding a nuclear holocaust, warfare in the foreseeable
future will continue to rely on the availability of large numbers
of well trained infantry Qtef. 16J. U.S. forces prepared to
defend Europe consist of both armored divisions and mechanized
infantry divisions. However, the mechanized infantry has organic
tanks and armored divisions have organic infantry. This again
underlines the importance of Infantry. U.S. combat doctrine
emphasizes the "combined arms" approach. That is, tanks, infantry,
close air support and artillery work as a mutually supporting
team to minimize the weaknesses of each combat arm while taking
iP,

full advantage of the strengths of each. Modern infantry is an
indispensable part of the combined arms team. Infantry combat
will probably be at least as dangerous, dirty and exhausting as
it has always been, if not more so.
B. THE COMBAT INFANTRY PERSON?
What are the critical factors that determine success in ground
combat and what effect would the introduction of a large number
of women have on infantry forces? No hard data exist on performance
of female infantry personnel and, in fact, very little systematic
and detailed data exist on male infantry performance in combat.
Also, there is very little military experience with female combat
forces. Thus, predicting the potential of female infantry
personnel will be very difficult. However, the actual data
gathered in combat have proven to be useful in understanding the
effectiveness of men in combat, and indicate what direction
research should take in trying to estimate the combat effective-
ness of women.
During WW II, a U.S. Array historian, S„L.A. Marshall, made a
surprising discovery while gathering historical data from front
line infantry units. He found that in most battles only 15$ of
the soldiers engaged in the battle actually fired their weapons.
In some exceptional rifle companies, as many as 25$ of the men
fired their weapons. He further observed that men who fired
their weapons started firing early in the action and continued
throughout the action. In subsequent actions, the same individual
tended to actively participate in the battle. Marshall concluded
that the active participants were somehow different from the
19

other soldiers Qtef. 2j. Infantry battles were won or lost by
a small percentage of the engaging forces. These startling facts
seem to have been missed by the officers and NCO's of these units,
even though they were with the men during the engagements. When
the results were published in 19^7* they were widely disputed by
professional military men. However, they were ultimately accepted
and changes to training were made so that by the Korean War over
50$ of the men fired their weapons, and as many as 100$ fired in
some perimeter defenses, according to Marshall. This was due in
part to new training techniques and also to awareness by unit
leaders who actively checked men under fire to ensure they were
firing.
Another discovery by Marshall was that the relatively few
active participants in a battle could make a decisive difference
in battle outcome. For example, the battle for Omaha Beach on
June 6, 19^j was a bitterly fought infantry battle with heavy
U.S. casualties. Omaha Beach was a two division front and along
this front, only six rifle companies were relatively effective
as units. Approximately eighteen were shattered before contri-
buting anything. According to Marshall, forty-seven men, at
widely scattered intervals along the beach, saved the day from
disaster. Marshall carefully documented this battle and the
number of active fighters appeared to be a crucial determinant
of combat effectiveness Qtef. if].
A second study, Fighter I [Ref. 18/ , estimated that the
percentage of active combat participants, or fighters as they
were called, was between 15$ and 20$ in the combat units studied
20

in Korea. This further confirmed Marshall's discovery, and
indicated that perhaps some men are better suited for combat
than others.
Assume for a moment that there exists a fixed percentage of
men who are effective fighters. Careful selection could theore-
tically raise the proportion of fighters in a unit and make it
more effective. Suppose that the proportion of women that are
fighters is also fixed. Then it would also be possible through
careful selection to increase the proportion of fighters in a
unit. Thus, if it were possible to predict combat performance
perfectly, it would make no difference as to whether combat
soldiers were male or female, they would all be effective (as
long as supply met demand, so selection could be exercised).
However, perfect selection is not possible. Improved training
methods offer a possibility for increasing the percentage of
fighters. In Korea, Marshall noted that the number of men firing
their weapons had increased. He credited this to improved training
and to officers who were aware of the problem and moved among the
men urging them to fire Qtef. l] . Unfortunately, Fighter I did
not confirm Marshall's findings [kef. l8j . Fighter I estimated
that the percentage of fighters was the same in Korea as in WW II.
Thus, the proportion of fighters in all male units may remain at
around 15$ to 20$ of a unit. If the proportion of women who are
fighters is identical to men, then the introduction of women into
combat units (with selection policies the same as for men) would
have no effect on the overall proportions of fighters. However,
if the proportion of women fighters differs significantly from
21

men, then the overall proportion of fighters could change. For
example, suppose that the percentage of women fighters was 5$
of the population, then, with no selection, the expected number
of fighters in a unit with equal numbers of men and women would
be 12. 5$* assuming that the proportion of male fighters was 20$
(see Figure l). This would give an overall percentage of fighters
of 12.5$. While there exists a sound estimate of the proportion
of males who will be fighters, there does not exist a similar
estimate for females.
The evidence reviewed suggests that a relatively small
proportion of soldiers actively carries the fight to the enemy
in times of war. This percentage appears to be in the vicinity
of 15-25$. These fighters are apparently crucial to the outcome
of infantry battles. Raising the proportion of fighters in a
unit would probably increase the combat effectiveness of the
unit. Lowering the proportion would have a detrimental effect.
If the proportion of women fighters is less than the proportion
for men, then introducing large numbers of women into combat
units would tend to lower the proportion of fighters to the
detriment of the unit unless valid selection procedures are used.
C. -COMBAT MODELING
1. Introduction
Testing new items of combat equipment or new tactics has
always been difficult. During times of war, researchers rarely
have time to test equipment in actual battle, and in times of
peace no wars are available to test equipment or ideas. Even in
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the contributions made to battle outcome by a single item is
difficult to measure. Ideally, a battle should be fought under
similar circumstances a number of times. Then an item under
test should be introduced and the battle re-fought several times
to see if the new item had any effect on battle outcome.
Obviously such a test method is impossible in actuality.
However, using the techniques of combat modeling, battles can be
created and recreated under identical circumstances. Researchers
can then document the changes to battle outcomes caused by the
introduction of new equipment or doctrine. The power of combat
modeling is repeatability of results. The possibility of assessing
the combat effectiveness of women using combat modeling is appealing
2. Combat Models
All combat models are abstractions and simplifications
of reality. Since a model is a representation of reality, combat
models may be taken to include military field exercises and exper-
iments, map exercises, war games, computer simulations and mathe-
matical equations. All have been used to model combat. However,
this portion of the paper only considers the latter three types
of models.
War games typically involve two opposing groups of players
who represent opposing commanders and their respective staffs.
The commanders and their staffs make decisions which effect the
course of the war game. Engagement results are either determined
stochastically, or an umpire may make a judgement based on exper-
ience, depending on the war game involved.
24

In even a simple war game, bookkeeping can be overwhelming,
Opposing forces must be tracked, engagements determined, commun-
ications sent and a myriad of other details followed. In some
cases, computers have been used to do the bookkeeping. However,
war games, even if computer assisted, may take years to develop
and may take many days or even months to play out a battle only
a few hours long.
War games are well suited as a training mechanism for
commanders and staff members, and they may reveal flaws in battle
plans or communication problems. However, experience with a wide
variety of models has not proved useful for detailed testing of
alternative weapons systems fRef. 19j - War games would not be
a viable way to assess the effectiveness of women in combat.
Machine simulations, which run without human participa-
tion, are among the more popular forms of combat models. This
popularity is possibly due to the complexity and microscopic
detail present in most machine simulations. It is not unusual
for simulations to model individual vehicles and even each pro-
jectile as it is fired. Terrain features can be modeled and
line-of-sight considerations can be incorporated. Thus, it
appears that machine simulations are isomorphic with the complex-
ities of the modern battlefield.
To develop a simulation, a detailed study of the processes
of a battle must be undertaken. The course of a simulation may
be ordered by critical events occurring during the simulation.
Such events may include rounds fired, vehicles destroyed, ground
covered and supplies used. In the so called Monte Carlo
25

simulation, a large number of probabilistic events are incorpor-
ated. Each event must have a probability distribution connected
with it. It may be a simple constant or a complex variable. For
example, the probability of firing, given line-of-sight, may be
unity. The probability of a hit may be a simple function of
range and the probability of a kill given a hit may be a function
of range, projectile type and aspect angle of the target.
Much of the input data required by detailed simulations
is in the form of probability functions. Some can be obtained
by firing range data or from other experimentation. Other data
are simply not available and must be determined judgments lly
.
Hardware performance data such as kill probabilities are normally
quite well known and modelled. Processes such as movement patterns
are not known at all, and must be assumed to a large extent.
Human factors such as bravery, training, morale, physical condi-
tioning, determination, aggressiveness, group cohesivenes3, and
other similar factors simply have not been quantified for use by
combat modelers.
Human variables have not even been manipulated into
combat models for the case of all male units, let alone to male
and female combat units. Innate differences between men and
women are denied by some, and the disputes concerning sex
differences are far from settled in any case Qtef. llj . Physical
processes of machinery are generally well understood and have
been modelled. That is, physical processes can be quantified




Analytical models substitute mathematical equations for
discrete simulations of real objects. While analytical models
may be deterministic or stochastic, a single set of input values
will give the same answer. In the stochastic case, the answer
will be in the form of a probability distribution. The analytical
model may be so complex that a computer is required for solution.
Nevertheless, it need only be solved once for each set of vari-
ables, unlike the Monte Carlo simulation which requires many
replications for a solution to be apparent. The primary advan-
tage of analytical models is their ability to clarify complex
situations. One disadvantage is that they are too abstract to
offer direct solution to operational problems in most cases.
These three types of models are essentially the only
types of combat models which directly utilize large scale compu-
ters for direct solution. While there are other ways to classify
models, the one described is sufficient to show that at present
combat models are simply not adequate to provide definitive
information about the combat effectiveness of women in infantry
units. All combat models suffer from the lack of combat data and
the difficulty of adequately describing combat interactions
jRef. 20]].
"I am firmly convinced that there exists almost no
experimentally verified models of combat processes of
interest to the military planner. That is, and let me
emphasize, the field is devoid of any experimentally
verified content.
.
.nor does it appear that sufficient
historical or experimental data to test any existing or
next generation models will become available in the near
future." 2
p
Bonder, S., An Overview of Land Battle Modeling in the U.S.
,




Bonder suggests that models are developed much like
natural philosophy—through pure reason and logic £Ref. 19]
.
Models, he claims, are better suited to provide insight into
system dynamics and provide data collection plans. Models should
not be used to predict the outcome of future battles.
Further difficulties are encountered simply in trying to
model the complexities of physical processes with mathematical
equations. For example, detection of a target depends on many
factors, some of which are not adequately understood: observer's
visual acuity, target movement, camouflage, range, line-of-sight,
obscuration, target signature from firing, as well as others.
Obviously, detection will vary not only from observer to observer,
but also from target to target. Human decision processes are
especially difficult to understand. Factors such as when to
engage, withdraw or what path to take are examples of such
decisions.
Because of these two factors, lack of data and complexity,
very few crucial infantry combat situations have been modelled
(see Table III). The modelling of the influence of human differ-
ences is not possible with the present state of the art in combat
models. A suitable model would allow the researcher to vary the
number of women in a unit and observe variations in mission
accomplishment. While appealing, this type of model does not
exist presently, nor does it appear that such a model will be
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III. STUDIES OF BEHAVIOR IN COMBAT
A. BACKGROUND
Combat soldiers, during war, face the possibility of prolonged
and intense stress. Combat stresses include a variety of unpleas-
ant, painful and dangerous situations. An individual is separated
from family and friends and is rigorously trained. He may be
transported to a foreign land with a hostile environment. He may
be subject to extremes of heat or cold and may experience total
physical exhaustion. During wartime, the threat of violent death
may be present for weeks or months.
Most individuals adapt quickly but some suffer emotional break-
down almost immediately upon separation from familiar surroundings
[Ref. 2lJ . Others break down only after prolonged exposure to
intense combat. All individuals will probably break down even-
tually if exposure to intense combat is allowed to continue
unabated. The upper limit to the number of combat days that can
be tolerated appears to be between 180 and 250 [Ref. 22J . The
success an individual has in adapting to combat seems to be
related to a number of complex, interrelated variables. Some
variables are related to the personality resources of the indivi-
dual, such as emotional stability and self-confidence. Other
variables are environmental such as length and intensity of combat,
adequacy of training and rotational policy.
There have been some attempts to characterize the personality
resources that an effective fighter carries with him into combat.
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Marshall felt that 'effective infantrymen were somehow "different"
from other infantrymen. He noted that those men who fought in
one action would be the fighters in subsequent actions [kef. 2j[.
In other words, combat effectiveness in an individual was stable
over time. Another study, Fighter I jjtef. 18J , measured a number
of proven combat fighters and non-fighters at the end of the
Korean War. This study assumed stability of combat effectiveness
over time. An alternate point of view was presented by Swank
and Marchland (_Ref. 2lJ . They claimed that combat behavior
changed over time. They identified four stages. The first stage
was characterized as becoming "battle wise" covering the first
7 to 30 days of combat. This was followed by a period of maximum
effectiveness. Then came a period of over reaction and mounting
anxiety, followed finally by a feeling of total hopelessness and
apathy. In a review of the above material, Kern Qlef. 23J felt
that Marshall and the Fighter I researchers had observed a cross
section of the four stages outlined by Swank and Marchland.
Adequate combat fighters were in stage II and inadequate combat
fighters were in stage IV. Kern felt that adequate training
would increase the duration of stage II in many soldiers.
B. FIGHTER RESEARCH SERIES
The Fighter I study was one of a series of studies using
actual combat data. No women were studied, but it did link
human attributes with combat performance. It has never been
replicated; so there may be some question as to its validity.
However, it did offer Insights into the behavioral aspects of
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infantry combat. Fighter I may also provide clues in considering
the question of women in combat.
The Fighter I study attempted to differentiate between
fighters and non-fighters using a variety of tests and measure-
ments. The research was done in the autumn of 1953 in Korea with
men from the 45th, 2nd and 7th Infantry Divisions. The survivors
of combat actions were interviewed individually. Each interviewee
was asked to name two or three men he would most like to have had
next to him during the engagements in which they were involved.
Each man was then asked to describe specific incidents from
combat experience to support the choices. When two or mere men
gave specific instances of good combat behavior or poor combat
behavior (see Appendix A for definitions) for an individual, that
individual was selected for participation in the research. In
all, 3^5 men were selected based on specific, verified examples
of effective or ineffective action in combat. Of the 3^5 men,
35 were lost due to combat attrition or rotation. This left 310
men who were eventually tested.
The men represented extremes on a presumed continuum of
combat proficiency ranging from very good to very poor. Although
exact percentages were not measured, the research team concluded
that approximately the top (in terms of combat proficiency) 15
to 20 percent of the men in the company-sized units were tested
as well as the bottom 15 to 20 percent. Thus, the middle 60 to
70 percent of the men were not rated who displayed neither





The men were given a battery of 27 questionnaires and inven-
tories as well as 60 objective tests. (See reference 18 for a
list of tests.) In addition, the men were given a one hour
clinical interview. In all, approximately 40 hours of tests and
measurements were administered, making this possibly the most
tested group of infantrymen in history. The researchers who
administered the tests did not know which men were classified
as fighters and which were classified as non-fighters until the
termination of the testing phase. The men were not aware of the
true purpose of the tests. Thus, the research was done in the
double blind mode to reduce possible biases.
Analysis of the data revealed that racial difference domin-
ated many of the measurements which seemed to differentiate
fighter from non-fighter. Proprotionately more blacks than
whites were named as non-fighters (see Table IV).
TABLE IV.
RACIAL MIXTURE OF SAMPLE
SamnlP Native Borno p e White Black Other
N % N % N % TOTAL
Fighter 134
Non-Fighter 67
67 18 21 14 59 166
33 66 79 10 41 143
Total 201 100 84 100 24 100 309
Egbert, R. L. and others, Fighter I; An Analysis of Combat
Fighters and Non-Fighters , U.S. Army Leadership Human Research
Unit, p. 15, 1957.
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The researchers were unable to determine whether the dispro-
portionate number of blacks classified as non-fighters was a
result of racial prejudice. No information was gathered on the
race of the soldier-raters. Thus, the determination was made to
concentrate the analysis on the native born white sample to elimin-
ate possible racial bias.
The analysis was able to show that the fighter tended to (as
compared to the non-fighter):
1. Be more intelligent
2. Be more masculine
3. Be a "doer"
4. Be more socially mature
5. Be preferred socially and in combat by his peers
6. Have greater emotional stability
7. Have more leadership potential
8. Have better health and vitality
9. Have a more stable home life
10. Have a greater fund of military knowledge
11. Have greater speed and accuracy in manual and physical
performance
The list of differences was extensive and tended to show a
clear difference between the fighter and non-fighter in psycholo-
gical, physical and social areas. However, the ground forces are
faced with a very different problem. They would like to determine
from a relatively undifferentiated group of men, who would tend
to be better fighters. That is, the problem was to determine
prior to combat what easily measured characteristics would tend
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to identify potential fighters. What the ground forces could
use would be a truly predictive model.
A follow on study termed "Fighter II" attempted to develop
a predictive model based on the findings of Fighter I. There
was no war on at the time, so artificial stress situations were
created based on the premise that war was an extreme form of
stress. From Fighter I, a test instrument called the Interest,
Opinion Questionnaire (IOQ) was developed based on questionnaire
items that best differentiated between fighters and non-fighters.
The men were tested with the IOQ as well as with many of the
scales and instruments used in Fighter I. In addition, the men
were subjected to six stress situations, and their performances
judged. The results are shown on Table V.
TABLE V
CORRELATION OF IOQ SCORES WITH
PERFORMANCE IN STRESS SITUATIONS
Stress Situation
Correlation
With IOQ Sa mple Size
Combat-in-Cities -.14 109
Jump Tower .27 113
Perimeter Defense -.28 80
Dark Room .14 110
Shock-Arithmetic -.06 114
Oil Fires .05 110
Adapted from Meeland, T., Egbert, R. L., Miller, I., Field Stress:
A Preliminary Study of Its Structure, Measurement and Relationship
to Combat, U.S~ Army Leadership Human Research Unit, p~ 56] 1957.
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The oil fire situation was considered by the men undergoing
testing, the researchers and outside experts to be the most
stressful situation. It was thought to be the most realistic
and closest to war. However, scores were not predictive of
performance in the oil fires situation. Whether the IOQ was a
good predictor of combat performance remained unverified. It
certainly was not a way of identifying good oil fire fighters
[Ref. 2^].
Three of the findings of Fighter I are of particular interest
to the question of women in combat. These are the findings con-
cerning masculinity, the "doer syndrome," and health and vitality.
Due to the design of the study, particularly the fact that measure-
ments were taken after combat rather than before, generalizations
based on the findings must be made cautiously. However, the
findings are Indicative of possibly important characteristics
of fighters.
Fighters, as defined in Appendix A, tended to have better
health and vitality than non-fighters. This was partially deduced
from physical measurements of the subjects. Fighters were one
inch taller than non-fighters (statistical significance less than
.01) and eight pounds heavier (statistical significance less than
.05). Figures 2 and 3 show the relationship of male and female
recruit measurements to those of fighters and non-fighters
.
Fighters were not only different from non-fighters but also
Data on recruit measurements taken from an unpublished report on
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different from a normal population of male recruits. The mean
height and weight for women are far below those for men. If, as
the research suggests, physical measurements are connected with
combat performance, then women would be at a decided disadvantage.
Fighters were also more masculine than non-fighters. Mascu-
linity, as measured by masculine interests scores on the Strong
Vocational Blank (SVIB), was significantly higher. Also femin-
inity-^ as measured by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI) and the California Personality Inventory (CPI)
was significantly lower. Unfortunately, the researchers did not
compare the data with scores from other populations, e.g., from
civilians of comparable ages. (See Appendix B for a brief des-
cription of the MMPI and the CPI.) In a purely qualitative sense,
however, the difference in raw score means was noteable. The
differences between the mean scores for fighters and non-fighters
on all three tests were significant (at less than .001), and the
non-fighters' means were all in the more feminine direction.
Masculinity-femininity (M-F) scales are derived using only
those questionnaire items which best differentiate men and women.
2
The Masculinity-Femininity scales of the SVIB measure masculine,
interests and feminine interests. For example, masculine
interests include outdoor occupations (e.g., rancher, forester)
require mechanical aptitude (e.g., engineer, auto mechanic) or
are physically strenuous (e.g., construction worker).
^Femininity as measured by the MMPI and CPI tend to measure
cultural differences in the way boys are raised as compared tc
girls. For example, women tend to express greater fear of
burglers than do men. Presented with the following item and
asked to circle the word that seems most natural in comparison,
men would more frequently circle gun or explosion and women




All M-F scales tend to greatly exaggerate sex differences by
design. Perhaps the most widely known M-F scale is the one
designed by Terman and Miles [Ref. 25/ . In order to compare the
scores in the Fighter study with another population, it was
necessary to rescale the Fighter data. A common mean and standard
deviation was determined for each of the separate scales weighted
for the number of fighters and non-fighters. The scores were
then standardized to a mean of 52 and a standard deviation of
50 to correxpond with the Terman and Miles scale. The numerical







Rescaled Me an Scores
Non-
Fighters Fighters Scores Fighters Fighters
CPI Fem. 16.17 18.02 16.79 6O.96
h.
34.22
MMPI Fem. 5.^5 6.57 5. S3 61.50 33.50
SVTB Fem. 50.84 46.84 49.49 61.45 33.44
N = 130 Fighters
N = 66 Non-Fighters
The results were superimposed on the Terman and Miles scale.
The results are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 provides a graphic illustration of the degree of
separation between men and women that is possible using carefully
selected questionnaire items. Since M-F scales are designed to
4For the MMPI and SVTB femininity scales, higher scores indicated
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Adapted from Terman, L. M. , Miles, C. C, Sex and Personality ,
p. 160 and l8l, Russell and Russell, 1936.
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differentiate between men and women, women generally would score
differently from men on similar scales constructed from the
MMPI, CPI, and SVIB. Scores of women on such scales were not
available for comparison. Thus, it was necessary to resort to
the estimates depicted in Figure 4.
Unfortunately, no truly predictive model for fighters exists,
and the likelihood of developing one based on combat experience
is slim. The process of developing tests capable of predicting
combat behavior would be a long and involved process, and would
have a low probability of success. First, a task analysis is
required in order to determine what measurable qualities are
required for the job (ground combat). Then, suitable instruments
must be selected or developed. Next, the instruments would be
administered and the results matched against a criterion of success
or failure for the subjects. Those test instruments which do not
predict well would be modified or dropped. Finally, the revised
instruments would be re-administered to a new group of subjects
to validate the results and eliminate possible spurious correlations.
The first two steps in developing a fighter aptitude test
have been taken by the Fighter studies. The data gathered en
the combat survivors were, in effect, directed at determining
attributes required of fighters. Also, an experimental test
instrument was developed to attempt to identify fighters. However,
in order to be proven predictive, the IOQ would have to be admin-
istered prior to combat. Trained psychologists would then inter-
rogate combat survivors to determine who had met the fighter
criterion and who had failed. It is possible that some of the
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subjects would become fatalities before a determination could be
made as to their combat effectiveness. Obviously, a war would be
required first, and nations do not go to war in order to gather
data
.
Further, field tests that artificially induce stress do not
seem to be effective in predicting fighters and non-fighters.
In "A Review of Fighter I -VI" [Ref. 26j, the author stated that
the crucial situation in combat seemed to be the requirement for
action in the constant face of death. Men will attempt tasks in
training situations or in field experiments when they feel that
adequate steps have been taken to ensure their safety, but the
same tasks may not be attempted if in doing so the threat of
death increases. The problem of research in this area, then, is
getting men to risk their lives, or think they are, in accomplishing
some task in a training environment. Clearly, this is not feasible
in today's society, although similar experiments were done at one
time [Re f . 2jJ .
The review of the fighter research mentioned above described
a theory about combat fighters in terms of activity of the indivi-
dual soldier. A person who has developed a strong sense of
security and confidence in his ability and has spread this ability
over" a wide variety of activities should do better in combat. In
other words, if a person has already engaged in and mastered a
variety of risk situations such as boxing, mountaineering, flying,
scuba diving and the like, he would have strong confidence in his
ability to control his surroundings even when faced with death.
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The "doer syndrome" was perhaps the most significant finding
of the Fighter I study in relation to the question of women in
combat. The fighters had participated in more activities, hobbies
and sports than had non-fighters (19 activities as compared to
15). They tended to prefer body contact sports and had partici-
pated in them longer and more frequently than had non-fighters.
The activities that fighters participated in included gardening,
racing, swimming, horseback riding, repairing automobiles and
carpentry. Non-fighters participated in painting, cartooning and
writing significantly more often than fighters.
Julia Fields commented in, "On the Psychology of Women: A
Survey of Empirical Studies," ptef. 28j that, on the average,
females are less physically active than males from birth onwards.
She also commented that males have a greater preference for out-
door activity, are more prone to risk taking and greatly excel
women In athletic ability. The differences she speaks of are
more or less small differences in means, with a great degree of
distribution overlap, except in athletic ability. Maccoby and
Jacklin [Ref. llj conclude that men are more interested In
competitive sports than women. Tyler [Ref. 29J refers to large
sex differences in several areas including participation and
interest in physically strenuous, adventuresome activities.
There appears to be little doubt that, on average, males are
more active, and participate in sports and other physically
strenuous activities to a greater degree than do women. Thus,
one of the more prominant differences between men and women is
also one of the biggest differences between fighters and
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non-fighters. Out of all the factors that were found to differ-
entiate fighters from non-fighters, three also differentiated
between men and women. Those three were: measurements of physical
size, masculinity, and the "doer syndrome."
Although there were some difficulties with the Fighter series
of studies, there did seem to be a very strong connection between
adequate combat performance and stereotypic male interests and
temperament. The nature of the data collection did not allow
for establishment of a casual relationship between masculinity
and combat performance, nor did it allow for development of a
predictive model. However, the connection shown in the Fighter
I study between masculinity and combat behavior is too great to
be ignored: on average, and at this time in our culture, women




IV. SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF INFANTRY UNITS
A. BACKGROUND
From antiquity until after the American Civil War, men
fought relatively close to one another. Even during World War
I, average troop density was 464 men per square kilometer.
Increasing firepower made frontal assaults by massed infantry
suicidal — as World War I demonstrated. By World War II, troop
density had dropped to 33 men per square kilometer (refer to
Table II) and men were taught to take full advantage of cover
and concealment. It was in this context that Marshall discovered
two phenomenon of infantry combat other than those previously
discussed. First, relatively light fire coming against an
advancing Infantry unit often served to stall the advance for
longer than necessary. He observed that men under fire scattered
and went to ground losing sight of each other. Each man found
himself totally alone and without support. Unit leaders found
themselves out of touch with their men. Once the momentum of
the advance was lost, extraordinary measures were often required
to renew it. Second, Marshall observed that if men in the unit
were strangers to one another, they would not stand and fight.
If an enemy breakthrough was imminent and headquarters personnel,
such as cooks and drivers, were pressed into service, they would
drift away while being led towards the fight. Those personnel
that made it to the front line would often be worthless in the
action. Effectiveness in infantry combat seemed to be very




The explanation for this behavior seemed to be related to
the strength of the primary groups that were formed by the men
in the units involved. A primary group is a small group of
individuals characterized by intimate, frequent, face-to-face
interactions. Four other features differentiate a "group" from
a collection of individuals. These are a common set of goals
or motives, a set of norms, a set of roles and a network of
interpersonal attractions Qtef. 3^0 . A member of a primary
group feels himself bound very strongly by the established norms.
At the same time, the member of a primary group develops strong
affections for one or more of the members and is thereby tied
into the common fate of the group.
Since World War II, the importance of unit cohesiveness has
been well established in the literature (see Ref. 31* p. 243 for
a list of nine titles and authors through 1970). Charles Moskos
observed several U.S. Army squads in 1965 and again in 1967 in
Vietnam. He reported that the concept of primary groups had
limitations in explaining combat performance. The soldiers
participated in the primary group structure out of necessity.
The overriding motivation was for personal survival and partici-
pation in the primary group was limited to just what was required
for survival. The soldier's view of the war was intensely
individualistic, heightened perhaps by the one year rotation
policy. An individual's war was over when he rotated. Moskos
did not deny the existence of primary groups, merely reinterpreting
them as due to "enlightened self-interest" rather than to a




Gabriel and Savage, on the other hand, claimed that the one
year rotational policy and a lower quality of leadership, virtually
destroyed the primary group structure of the Army in Vietnam.
The absence of primary group structure explained widespread drug
abuse among soldiers, as well as combat refusals and "fragging"
Qtef. 323.
B. THE WERMACHT IN WORLD WAR II 5
Perhaps the best illustration of the power of primary groups
was the strength of the Wermacht in World War II.
"Although distinctly outnumbered and in a strategic sense
quantitatively inferior in equipment, the German Army, on
all fronts, maintained a high degree of organizational
integrity and fighting effectiveness through a series of
almost unbroken retreats over a period of several years."
{Ret. 35/
This quote was from an article written on the Wermacht by Edward
Shils and Morris Janowitz shortly after World War II. The super-
iority of the German Array during WW II was widely recognized, and
Dupuy attributed this superiority to the German staff system ]j^ef.
3j. Shils and Jancivitz, however, contended that the superiority
of the Wermacht was largely due to strong primary groups festered
by the Wermacht. These primary groups were characterized by their
small size (rarely larger than squad size) and the intimate, warm
atmosphere shared by the group members.
The ability of the individual to prevail in battle was due
to the strong social fabric of his primary group. The Wermacht
high command encouraged the formation of strong, interdependent
5




primary groups by keeping units together as much as possible.
When a division was worn down from combat losses, it was with-
drawn as a unit from the front. Combat losses were replaced and
the unit retrained, thus giving the soldiers time to again form
primary groups. This was in contrast to the U.S. Army policy of
keeping divisions on line and feeding replacements in piecemeal
TRef. 3^£J • As long as the Wermacht was successful in maintaining
these strong primary groups, the German Army fought with extra-
ordinary tenacity in spite of catastrophic defeats. When primary
groups were broken by loss of leaders, major breaks in the supply
chain or severe casualties, disaffection quickly followed and
the will to resist evaporated. The German Army resisted effectively
until almost the very end of WW II and for the most part had to
be overrun and destroyed in detail.
Wermacht units with strong primary groups suffered very little
from desertion or spontaneous surrender. German soldiers from
such units spoke very highly of the degree of comradliness of
the units and often described them as "one big, happy family."
The few deserters from those units with strong primary groups
were characterized chiefly by their failure to be absorbed into
the primary group structure of the Wermacht. The vast majority
of deserters captured during the early phases of the war came
from units composed of "Volksdeutsch" (individuals of German
heritage residing outside German boundaries), as well as Austrians,
Poles, Yugoslavs and Russians coerced into service. The "Voile-
sturra" units, composed of boys, old men and older married men,
were among the most worthless German units during the latter
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stages of the war. The most obvious common element of all these
less effective units was the lack of primary group formation
within the units. This was due to factors present in the units
which prevented the formation of primary groups, such as, lack
of a common language, bitterness over coersion and failure to
break previous primary group memberships of family and community
in the case of the Volksturm. Spontaneous mass desertions and
surrender were much more common in these units than in the
regular Wermacht. Towards the very end of the war, makeshift
units were hurriedly thrown together from new recruits, stragglers,
airforce men, sailors and concentration camp inmates. These units
quickly disintegrated in the heat of battle. This was in direct
contrast to regular Wermacht divisions. These divisions, even
very late in the war, had to be defeated in detail to be rendered
ineffective. Where primary groups were strong, the units
resisted, where primary groups were weak or non-existent, the
units generally failed in combat.
Shils and Janowitz {Ref. 33} also reported several contributing
factors to primary group solidarity in the Wermacht. These factors
were the quality of leadership, the presence of a "hardcore" nucleus
within each group, and the German concept of "soldierly honor."
The junior officers and NCO s were a highly select group of
individuals. The officers were trained to treat their men with
a combination of sternness and fatherly benevolence. They held
their men in high esteem. The enlisted men reciprocated this
esteem and German infantrymen frequently praised the conduct of
their officers and NCO's. The job of the leaders was made easier
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by the presence of a "hardcore" among the enlisted ranks. This
"hardcore" comprised about 10 to 15 percent of the lower enlisted
ranks. They were men who had grown up and participated in the
best phases of the rebuilding of Germany under National Socialism
and had a deep sense of community solidarity and placed a high
value on "toughness" and "manly comradliness." The "hardcore"
served as models to the less enthusiastic men and were instru-
mental in developing and maintaining group solidarity. Finally,
German society considered military life as a privilege in
contrast to the British and American's concept that military
service was a disagreeable necessity.
Factors that served to weaken Wermacht primary groups,
according to Shils and Janowitz, were the physical isolation of
individuals or fragments of groups, the family ties of the
soldiers, and the demand for individual survival. Prolonged
isolation increased the frequency of surrender. Individuals
isolated by tactical situations and fearing destruction, sur-
rendered much more readily than those individuals bound by the
norms and physical ties of their primary groups. Towards the
end of the war, desertion was more likely by individuals who
returned home on leave. This was a consequence of loss of
personal contact with the Array primary group, a renewal of the
family primary group bonds and the increasing likelihood of
personal destruction upon return to the Army. The threat of
death was the most persistent way that weakening of the primary
groups occurred. However, it was only under the most severe
conditions of deprivation or hopelessness that dissolution of
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primary groups occurred. Under most circumstances, the presence
of the primary group seemed sufficient to ensure that the average
German soldier would stand his ground and resist.
The Wermacht, in WW II, was favored by a number of factors
that enhanced primary group solidarity. When group structure
was shattered or not allowed to develop, a severe degradation
of effectiveness ensued. The observations of Shils and Janowitz
on the Wermacht agreed with those of Marshall on the U.S. Army.
The reason a man stands and fights in combat is because of the
affection and support of his close comrades.
C. THE U.S. ARMY
1. Background
Whereas primary group solidarity has been established as
central to the success of the Wermacht in WW II, research results
for U.S. forces have not been as clear. Marshall established the
necessity that men in a unit know each other and rely on each
other Qtef. 2j. Little emphasized the importance of the "buddy
relationship" in the Korean War Qtef. 3{Q. Clark found that
squads in Korea varied in the amount of social cohesion present,
but none seemed to display deep interpersonal relations Qtef. 35j.
Finally, in Vietnam Moskos determined that personal survival was
paramount and group ties secondary Qtef
. 3Q . In no case, have
researchers discovered in U.S. forces the deep, affectionate ties
that seemed to characterize the Wermacht primary groups.
2. Rifle Squads in Korea
In 1952 and 1953; a research team from the Human Resources




Qtef. 35} > Their purpose was to discover what factors accounted
for differences in effective and ineffective squads. The team
gathered data on individual squad members and also case histories
on the day-to-day activities of the squads. They discovered
five leadership characteristics that seemed to be important to
effective functioning of squads. They also discovered how
difficult differentiating an effective squad from an ineffective
squad was.
In order to differentiate squads, the team asked platoon
commanders for effectiveness ratings. This method was not
entirely satisfactory since platoon commanders often did not
have detailed information on squad effectiveness. The team also
requested information from squad members on the effectiveness of
their own squad. This method was not entirely satisfactory
either, and the research team finally settled on a combination
of both types of effectiveness rating data. An operational
definition of effectiveness based on "success in a combat action"
was evidently not possible. This may have been due to the static
nature of the warfare at the time. (The only combat action was




From the case histories of the squads, five leadership
functions were isolated:
Managing - formal functions which the squad leader was held
accountable for through the chain of command, such
as distribution of supplies and communication of
orders
Defining - verbalizing acceptable behavior
Modeling - demonstrating expected behavior
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Teaching - demonstrating or verbalizing a special skill
Sustaining - providing emotional support to squad members
The number of functions displayed by each squad varied. One
member of virtually all squads was managing. In most squads,
somebody performed the defining function. However, the functions
of modeling, teaching and sustaining were more sporadic (see
Table VII ).
TABLE VII
NUMBER OF SQUADS PERFORMING LEADERSHIP FUNCTIONS






Clark, R. A., Leadership in Rifle Squads on Korean Front Lines
,
U.S. Army Leadership Human Research Unit, p. 23, 1955.
Other squad members besides squad leaders were found to
be performing leadership functions. In the 69 squads, 66 squad
leaders, 49 assistant squad leaders and 35 other squad members
were found to be performing one or more functions. Effectiveness
was not influenced by the position of the person who performed
the leadership function, but by whether the function was being
performed at all. Leadership was defined as consistent behavior
by one of the squad members that fell into one of the five




An attempt was made to assess squad cohesiveness by
determining interpersonal choices. Squad members were asked to
choose three platoon members most preferred and three platoon
members least preferred based on five criteria, e.g., as a
bunker mate, have alongside in a fire fight.
The results were clearly disappointing. Almost all
squads were split into an "in group" and an "out group". Typi-
cally, four members were in the out group and five members were
in the in group. Approximately one-third of the most preferred/
least preferred choices were made toward individuals outside the
squad. However, squad leaders in 39 out of 69 squads were chosen
as "most preferred" more often than the average squad member.
From this, the researchers concluded that, on the average, squad
leaders were members of the squads' primary groups. They further
concluded that each squad fit the definition of primary group,
but was not, in general, very cohesive as judged by interpersonal
choices.
Squad combat aggressiveness was determined by the presence,
in the squad, of a common desire to be aggressive in combat. If
each squad member expressed a desire for the squad to do something
or be_ something, verbalized a sense of responsibility to accom-
plish the goal, and could point to specific evidence that the
group was working toward accomplishing the goal, then the squad
was said to have a group goal. If, in addition, the goal was to
"seek out and destroy the enemy," then the group was said to
possess a high degree of combat aggressiveness. Twenty-one squads




21 SQUADS WITH COMBAT AGGRESSIVENESS AGAINST
48 SQUADS LACKING COMBAT AGGRESSIVENESS
Leadership Number Number Percent Percent
Function With Without With Without Dlff. Sig
Managing 20 47 .95 .98 -.03 *
Defining 18 34 .86 .71 .15 NS
Modeling 18 8 .86 .17 .69 .001
Teaching 12 14 .57 .29 .28 .03
Sustaining 13 11 .62 .23 .39 .002
* t-test of differences not appropriate
Clark, R. A., Leadership in Rifle Squads on Korean Front Lines
,
U.S. Army Leadership Human Research Unit, p^ 3^7 1955.
Modeling, teaching and sustaining type of leadership
functions appeared to be important determinants of combat
aggression. Unfortunately, combat aggression, in this study,
was defined by consensus of squad members and the validity of
the term is somewhat suspect. However, the presence of a common
group goal may have been important evidence of group cohesion.
Clark appears to have overlooked that fact.
More recent research has indicated that, although affec-
tive ties are important to primary groups, they are not neces-
sarily measured by the amount of "liking" that exists between
group members. According to Dunphy Qtef. 3*0 , the strength of
the group ties are determined by the existence of a basic agree-
ment of who is liked and who is disliked and also by who has
power and who does not. Cohesive primary groups are further
characterized by a strong sense of integration which maximizes
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group cooperation and minimizes conflict. The extent to which
integration is present in a group is measured by the extent to
which group goals are similarly ranked. Finally, cohesive groups
agree on who, outside the group, is liked and who is disliked.
There is also a consensus on ideas that are liked and disliked.
Dunphy emphasized the crucial role that primary groups play in
the military and stated that an army in battle is the prototype
of the primary group under stress.
Although Clark failed to detect strong, cohesive primary
groups among the squads in Korea, it was evident from the
research report that most of the squads were, to some extent,
cohesive, and many of the squads were, in fact, strongly cohe-
sive by Dunphy s criteria, e.g., consensus of squad status and
common group goals. For example, each of the nine -man squads
had two Korean soldiers as members. The two Koreans in each
squad were almost universally in an out group. In only one squad
was this not true. Almost all squads had at least one member who
was disliked by all other squad members. Further, men with actual
combat experience held positions of high status. Finally, the
presence in 21 squads of a desire to "seek out and destroy the
enemy" was strong evidence, not cnly of cohesive squads, but
also of squads with goals parallel to those of the U.S. Array.
The presence of "combat aggressiveness" was primarily an
indicator of squad cohesivene3s rather than combat proficiency.
However, the Fighter I study, presented earlier, did link actual
combat proficiency of individuals with the degree to which they

























Egbert, R. L. and others, Fighter I: An Analysis of Combat
Fighters and Non-Fighters , Human Resources Research Office,
P. 39, 1957.
Fighters tended to identify highly with their units more fre-
quently than did non-fighters. The data suggest that fighters
tend to come from more cohesive units if "identity with unit"
could be used as a measure of cohesiveness. The link between
unit cohesiveness and fighters' personal characteristics was
missing from the Fighter I study, however.
The U.S. Army in the Korean War did not foster primary
group structure with its doctrine. A one year rotation policy
was detrimental to unit cohesiveness. The policy of making up
patrols from volunteers certainly did not help squad cohesion.
Further, placing two Korean soldiers In each American squad was
not helpful. Clark determined that the Koreans were almost
always in an out group. Marshall observed that Korean members
of American squads were generally not effective [Ref. 17J
.
It may be that cohesive units lead to fighting behavior by squad




However, Korean soldiers fighting with the Republic of Korea
Army often fought well and inflicted heavy casualties on their
enemies Jjief. 393* Ifc is Probably safe to say that primary
groups formed among U.S. squads in spite of Army policy; the
extent to which primary groups were present was not as high as
could have been possible.
3. The Role of the Military Primary Group
Cohesive primary groups are necessary to the prosecution
of a war, but they are not sufficient. For maximum effectiveness,
the primary groups must actively espouse the goals of the larger
organization. This was the case for the 21 squads with combat
aggression in the Clark study. The key position in a squad is
the appointed squad leader. He must be a member of the primary
group, yet represent the demands of the Army. However, other
functions are required in order for the squad to develop cohe-
siveness. Functions such as modeling or teaching may be performed
by other members of a squad. In this way, a number of primary
groups may be welded into an army. The Wermacht not only had
highly cohesive primary groups, it had primary groups which
actively supported Wermacht goals.
The problem faced by the U.S. Army during the latter
stages of the Vietnam war may have been the result of oppositional
primary groups. Faris concluded that "fragging" could be viewed
as group action against troublesome superiors, e.g., superiors
who tried to enforce drug regulations or who sought excessive
combat action. Faris also suggested that mutiny was an obvious
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small group phenomenon [Ref. 38J • Thus, in Vietnam, the Army
may have been weakened by primary groups which actively opposed
its goals.
An army in combat requires primary groups with goals
similar to those of itself. Men do not seem to fight without
the support of their primary group. An army will not function
properly without the support of its primary groups.
D. WOMEN AND PRIMARY GROUPS
Research on military primary groups under the stress of
combat has been performed with all-male units. Introducing
women into this all-male domain will also introduce a large
measure of uncertainty about combat performance of small units.
This is for two reasons. First, research on gender-integrated
units under the stress of combat is not generally available.
Second, the principal stress in combat is the prolonged exposure
to the threat of death. The simulation of this intense stress
in field experiments is not feasible.
However, research on women In the civilian labor market has
been done. Oppenheimer reviewed the literature on Integrated
work groups and concluded that, in general, men and women compete
in separate job markets. Mixed work groups were not common. The
introduction of one or two females into a male work group involved
excessive adaptation to the presence of females. If enough women
were introduced so the sex ratio was approximately equal, then
the work group tended to split into two, possibly hostile groups,
along sexual lines [Ref. 39J.
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In a second review comparing men and women as leaders,
Hollander and Yoder proposed that, in small groups, the effect-
iveness of female leaders depended on leadership role and style,
as well as on situational characteristics. Generally, the role
of leader is expected to be filled by a man. Thus, a woman might
find herself handicapped by having first to prove herself as a
leader before performing her job as leader effectively. Both
men and women expect leaders to be men. Women were much less
likely to emerge as leaders in gender integrated groups. Leader-
ship styles were a second important determinant of effective
female leadership. Holland and Yoder found that researchers
generally agreed that women had a greater concern for inter-
personal relations than did men. Men tended to focus on task
accomplishment or individual performance. Finally, situational
influences were also considered important to effectiveness. Sex
composition was one of these important situational influences.
Group performance and group harmony were affected by whether the
group was integrated or segregated, and by whether the leader
was male or female. Also, sex typing of task performance was
another important factor since success or failure of a leader
and subsequent evaluation by group members tended to focus on
whether the task presented was stereotypically masculine or
feminine jRef. 4oJ
.
Other factors are important to the fate of women in organi-
zations. Bartol proposed that upwardly mobile women are filtered
out of the promotional structure of organizations at various
career stages and, thus, do not become successful top level
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managers Qlef. 4lJ . Kanter concluded that a single woman in an
all-male organization is at a decided disadvantage due to tokenism
The token woman is always in the limelight where sex differences
are accentuated Qtefs. 42, 43^]. While it is generally accepted
\ that men and women are equal in many achievement-related charac-
teristics such as intelligence and motivation, there is strong
evidence that women tend to minimize their successes and emphasize
their failures. That is, women are far more likely to take
personal responsibility for failure and far less likely to take
responsibility for success on a given task. This was found to
be especially true when women worked with men Qtef. 44J. In
reviewing leadership styles, Tavris and Offir found that women
were more likely than men to use indirect methods such as emo-
tional pleas or suggestions rather than authority to get their
way in group or leadership situation [Ref. 45^].
From the literature reviewed, it appears that if women were
to be included in infantry units, they would have a substantial
impact. The importance of primary groups tc infantry units was
established by Shils and Janowitz [Ref. 32? * as well as by other
researchers [Refs. 2, 31^ 34, 35 and 3£J. Introducing women into
rifle squads may be disruptive to primary group solidarity. On
the other hand, women may prove beneficial. Clark [Ref. 35j
found that a higher percentage of combat effective squads had
one or more members who provided emotional support as compared
with squads without combat aggression (refer to Table VIII).
Since women are generally concerned with interpersonal relations
in group action [Ref. 4oJ, more than are men, they may provide
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an influence increasing unit cohesiveness. This may be offset,
however, by the greater reluctance women have in assuming
informal leadership roles Qtef. 4(5] . It may also be offset by
the greater reluctance with which group members accept women
leaders [kef. 4oJ.
It is possible that some gender-integrated squads will be
cohesive, effective combat units. On the other hand, some
gender-integrated squads may fall apart under the stress of
combat when all-male squads would have not.
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V. A STUDY OF JUDGMENTS CONCERNING
APPROPRIATE JOBS FOR WOMEN
A. BACKGROUND
The preceding chapters have reviewed the literature concerning
the individual and group variables influencing the performance
of ground combat units. It has been concluded that certain of
those variables have been identified as important correlates of
unit combat performance. Some possible unit performance impli-
cations of gender -Integra ted units have also been identified,
but predictions regarding the combat effectiveness of gender-
integrated units cannot be made with confidence.
Before the United States decised to field gender-integrated
ground combat units, military policymakers, Congress, the Execu-
tive, the Judiciary, and the American public will have had to
move to support the use of women in ground combat roles. Thus,
it becomes important to examine how individuals make judgments
concerning whether or not a job can be appropriately filled by
a woman. For instance, it seems likely that most individuals
would judge secretarial and nursing jobs as being appropriate
for women; but jobs such as stevedore and machinegunner would be
judged as inappropriate for women. This chapter presents the
results of a study of perceptions concerning the appropriateness
of different jobs for women. Basic descriptive statistics
summarizing the perceptions will be shown, and the results of




A questionnaire was developed which contained 51 civilian and
military occupations to be rated on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 as
ideally suited to women and 7 as totally unsuitable. (See Appen-
dix C.) The occupations were selected on the basis of several
criteria which might be used to judge whether an occupation was
suitable or unsuitable. These criteria were traditional/untradi-
tional jobs, life taking/life saving jobs, heavy labor/light
labor jobs, dangerous /safe jobs and dirty/clean jobs.
The questionnaire was administered to 62 U.S. military
officer graduate students at the Naval Postgraduate School in
May of 1979. Five of the respondents were female officers.
Seven questionnaires were deleted since the respondents selected
one number for all occupations. The method used to scale the
data would not accept such responses. Three of the seven ques-
tionnaires that were deleted were from females. The final
sample was 55 graduate students, of whom two were females. Table
X contains the mean and variance of the ratings for all 51 occu-
pations from the 55 subjects.
B. MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING
1. Background
The first technique used to analyze the data was multi-
dimensional scaling. This technique attempts to map a number of
stimuli (in this case, jobs) into dimensions based on the similar'
ity of the stimuli as first proposed by Kruskal [kef. 46j. The
purpose of multidimensional scaling is to discover any underlying
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No. Mean Variance Occupation
35 4.3636 2.3276 Rifleperson
36 2.0909 1.4424 Bank manager
37 3.9273 2.1138 Sniper
38 3.8000 2.3603 Poseidon missile crew member
39 1.8000 0.9567 Military pay clerk
40 4.0545 2.0813 Artillery cannoneer
41 1.9091 1.4221 Student (NPS)
42 2.0182 1.3804 Surgeon (CONUS
)
43 3.1818 1.9322 Riveter
44 4.2000 2.1511 Coal miner
45 4.0182 2.4721 Executive officer (DD)
46 1.4545 0.8497 Nurse ( CONUS)
47 1.7273 1.1903 Sewing machine operator
48 4.1455 2.1981 Machine gunner
49 4.4000 2.4357 Company commander
50 2.6364 1.5135 Small arms repairperson
51 1.7091 1.0102 Secretary
Judgments (ratings) were recorded on a rating scale on which
1 = Ideally suited for a woman and 7 = Totally unsuited for a
woman. See Appendix C for a copy of the Questionnaire.
66

The scaling technique requires a measure of distance
between each pair of stimuli. The points are then arranged in
an n-dimensional space, so that the original distances between
pairs of points are satisfied as closely as possible. The degree
to which the points cannot be arranged to satisfy all inter-pair
distances is called "stress."
The KYST program used in this thesis used an upper
triangular matrix with no diagonal elements as data input. Each
pair of stimuli points j and k had a similarity measure (to be
described in the next section) say, X.^., j<k. The program derived
an initial configuration in the dimensionality specified by the
user. It then determined the Euclidean distance between each
pair of points j and k and regressed this distance on the simi-
larity data. The values of the regression were then used to
calculate stress. The program then moved the points around in
space according to a steepest descent, minimization algorithm in
an attempt to reduce stress. When the program reached a local
minimum, it terminated and printed the results.
2. Similarity /Dissimilarity Calculations
Similarity data reauired by the KYST program were calcu-
lated by the method suggested by Burton [~Ref. 47j . Burton had
subjects sort a deck of 60 cards, each with an occupational name
on it, into piles such that each pile had occupations which the
subject thought were similar. For the purposes of this thesis,
each questionnaire item with the same scale rating was assumed
to be similar in "suitability" for women. All items with the
same rating were called a cell for each subject. Thus, the term
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C ia was used to denote the number of occupations in cell a for
subject i. Then, the probability that any two items were in the
same cell was P ia = (C ia ) (C ia - l) / (51 * 50). Also, the
probability that any two items were in different cells was
Q. 1 - (Pj_i + ... + ^17) as long as there were at least 2
cells in the subject's questionnaire.
If only a few occupations were in the same cell, then
this cell contained high informational value as to the similarity
of the occupations. In the same way, if two occupations were in
different cells and the probability of their being in different
cells was low (Q.^ low), then this again has high informational
value as to the dissimilarity of the pair. This informational
value was captured by taking logarithms to the base two. Thus,
the appropriate similarity/dissimilarity factor for each cell
Cjk was:
^iki = "log2P ia : J' and k in the sarae cel1 c ia
or X^j = log20-^ : j and k in different cells
Since the size of a subject's cells was not, in general,
the same, it was necessary to standardize the measurements using
the normal distribution. Thus, mean m^ and variance s. were
calculated for each subject i:
mi *
-ZLi( pia l0S2p ia> * °-il°S2ei
3 1




Finally, the similarity/dissimilarity measurement for each pair
of occupations j and k for subject i was:
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z jki = (xjki - rai)/s i
These were summed over i to get an upper triangular matrix such
that each pair of occupations had a measure of similarity/dis-
similarity. High positive values indicated extreme similarity
and negative values indicated dissimilarities. The highest
value was 57.68 for sewing machine operator and secretary. A






Thus, the transformed value was 2.32 for the sewing machine
operator and secretary. Similarly, measurements were obtained
for all 1275 pairs of occupations.
3. Results
Stress results for dimensions 1 through 6 are shown in
Figure 5. Stress for 2 dimensions was .1771. Figure 6 contains
the plots for two dimensions. The X axis seemed to be a measure
of whether an occupation has been traditionally male or female.
The most traditional male jobs were on the far right of the graph
and the most traditional female jobs were on the far left. The
meaning of the Y axis was not as clear, but it perhaps is a
measure of prestige since most of the jobs above the X axis were
more prestigeous than the jobs below the X axis. This was not
wholly satisfactory, however, since medic was rated above
surgeon as was used car salesman.
c
A stress value of .1771 is considered to be high and indicated
that perhaps more dimensions were involved jjtef. 48J. However,
an analysis of higher dimensions failed to reveal any obvious
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Failure of the data to reveal more than a single dimen-
sion was possibly the results of the method of data collection.
Subjects were asked to rate jobs on a scale from 1 to 7 as
suitable or unsuitable. A more satisfactory result might have
been attained had respondents been asked to sort cards, with a
single occupation each, into piles that were equally suitable
for women. Nevertheless, the data did seem to indicate .that
there was a strong element of tradition in the way jobs were
judged as suitable or unsuitable for women.
C. CLUSTER ANALYSIS
1. Background
In an attempt to extract more information from the data,
the technique of cluster analysis was applied. Like multidi-
mensional scaling, cluster analysis attempts to discover structure
within a large body of data Htef. 4cQ. It attempts to divide
the data into groups that have a high degree of "natural asso-
ciation." Clustering techniques require some measure of similarity
or distance between each pair of points being clustered.
For this analysis, a hierarchical clustering method was
used with the identical similarity matrix described in section
B. 2. above. The exact technique used was the single linkage
method [Ref. 4cfJ. First, the method starts with n clusters of
one point each. It searches through the similarity matrix for
the most similar pair of clusters. Then, the method merges the
pair, thus reducing the number of clusters by one. It then
updates the similarity matrix to reflect the revised similarities
between the merge and all other clusters. It repeats this n-1
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times so that only one cluster exists. In the single linkage
method, distances between each cluster are determined by the
distance between the two closest members of each cluster. Thus,
at each iteration, two clusters are grouped together according
to the distance between the two closest points that have not
already been clustered (Ref. bcQ,
2. Results
The results were more interpretable than were the results
for multidimensional scaling (see Figure 7). Items that were
clustered together had a high degree of "natural association"
for the most part. Due to the method of aggregating the raw
data, occupations clustered first were those that were most
consistently placed in the same category by subjects. Thus, on
the scales (class values) at the top and bottom of Figure 7 , low
numbers indicate more frequent and consistent groupings by
subjects
.
Starting from the left end of the cluster tree, the
sewing machine operator and secretary were clustered at class
value 1, as were the three infantry jobs of machinegunner,
company commander and rifleperson. (Note, however, that two
separate clusters are formed at step 1.) It was evident from
the mean scores of the suitability rankings (see Table 10) that
infantry jobs were considered less suitable for women. From the
cluster tree, it was evident that subjects were very consistent
in their judgments about suitability of those jobs for women.
By class value 3> the two nursing jobs had been clustered
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(branch l), and the two surgeon jobs had been clustered as a
pair. By class value 6 (branch 2), all of the most traditional
female jobs were clustered. Branch 3 seemed to include higher
status, more traditionally masculine jobs, but jobs which could
probably be performed equally well by both men and women. Branch
4 contained feminine jobs and the "job" of being a NPS student.
By scale value 12 (branch 5)* these two clusters had merged. At
scale value 8, lumberjack and stevedore were paired, and at 11,
garbage collector and coal miner were paired. By scale value 17
(branch J), a cluster contained all of the infantry jobs and the
Navy XO and CNO. Branch 8 contained the heavy labor jobs. By
scale value 20, branches 7 and 8 were merged and cannoneer and
Poseidon missile crew member were added to form branch 9. Branch
9 seemed to contain all traditionally masculine jobs. Branch
10 contained jobs requiring mechancial aptitude. By scale value
11, branches 9 and 10 had been merged and sewer worker, riveter
and chaplain had been added. Branch 12 contained branch 5 as
well as most jobs requiring light work of some kind. Thus, there
appeared to be two main classifications: branch 12 occupations
involved light work and branch 11 included traditional male
occupations other than those involving light work. There were
seven occupations, from assassin on down, which did not seem to
group well and these groups could not be identified.
Infantry jobs were most consistently chosen as less
suitable for women. Further, it made little difference whether
the infantry job was as a company commander or rifleperson,
since the four infantry jobs were clustered very early. Subjects
did not distinguish between Infantry jobs.
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Further, two major clusters were evident as described
in the previous paragraphs. No occupation in branch 12 required
heavy labor; this was probably a major factor in determining
judgments of suitability or unsuitability . Branch 11 contained
all traditionally masculine jobs other than those requiring light
work. The only exceptions to this criterion were the CNO, XO
and chaplain. These jobs all involve light work. However, these
jobs have been so strongly connected with men that it was felt
that the masculinity of the jobs overrode the criterion separating
branch 11 from branch 12. Thus, the technique clustered CNO, XO
and chaplain under branch 11 instead of branch 12.
Figure 8 is an effort to summarize visually the results
of the cluster analysis.
D. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PERCEPTIONS STUDY
Two major criteria of job suitability for women emerged from
the analyses. The first criterion seemed to be tradition. The
second criterion seemed to be light work. Thus, it appeared that
jobs that have been traditionally held by women, were judged
most suitable. This was evident from both the multidimensional
scaling and the cluster analysis. Jobs that involved light
working conditions were judged as next most suitable, e.g.,
surgeon, naturalist, bank manager. Jobs involving heavy labor,
mechanical aptitude, infantry and strongly traditional masculine
jobs were judged less suitable.
Of the original criteria that were considered as possible
determinants of suitability, two were eliminated. These were
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included in branch 12. Both contain an element of danger.
Janitor, considered to be a relatively dirty job, was also
included in branch 12. No conclusion was possible with the
life saving/life taking criterion. Medical professions were
under branch 12, but chaplain was under branch 11. Assassin
and medic were under neither branch.
Infantry jobs involve both heavy labor and a masculine
orientation. Thus, for women, infantry jobs were considered
as unsuitable as lumberjack or stevedore jobs. The data in
Table X can be used to determine the average perceptions of
the suitability for women of the 51 jobs included in the study
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis attempted to extend to gender-integrated combat
units the results of several studies of men in ground combat.
It was found that women, in general, may not be as suited to
ground combat as men. Men who were adequate combat fighters
were, on average, more masculine, according to several criteria,
than were non-fighters. Women, in general, obviously, are less
masculine than men by these same criteria, e.g., SVIB M-F scores.
Women, on average, are also less physically active, smaller in
stature and weigh less than men. Differences between combat
fighters and non-fighters on these factors were all found to be
statistically significant. Although predictions about the
fighting ability of individual women (or men) cannot be made
with confidence, the findings suggest that on average, the
ground combat fighting ability of women may not be as high as
that of men.
Further, women may be handicapped in primary group inter-
action. Clark found that several informal leadership functions
seemed important factors in squad aggressiveness and cohesiveness
[Ref. 35] • -i- n one factor, called sustaining, women might be able
to make a substantial contribution to unit social integrity if
they can overcome their reluctance to provide leadership. However,
other studies (in civilian settings) showed that women may be
less acceptable as leaders, or may even prove to be disruptive
to primary group solidarity. The loss of social cohesion would
probably prove disasterous In battle.
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Important criteria by which the students at the Naval Post-
graduate School judged the suitability of jobs for women, seemed
to be on the basis of physical strength requirements and tradition.
On this basis, resistance to the use of women in infantry might
be expected. The subjects in this study were all military graduate
students and different results might be expected if other popu-
lations were sampled. A poll on women in combat was recently
taken by George Gallup. He reported that the nation was almost
evenly divided on whether women should be drafted. Of the 43$
who answered "yes/ 1 only 44$ thought that women should serve in
"combat" [kef. 50j • The results of this national poll, support,
in a general way, the conclusion that resistence to women in
infantry may be encountered.
Finally, valid research in this area might be extremely
difficult. The standard research tool (combat modeling) is not
useful due to a lack of human performance data and a lack of
adequate models to explain underlying psychological and social
combat interactions. Also, field tests may not prove useful
since one of the primary stresses in combat is the threat of
death. Simulating this extreme form of stress does not seem
feasible.
"It is recommended that further research be done concerning
how people judge the appropriateness of different jobs for women.
Perception data should be more representative of the general
population of adults. Further research should also examine what
jobs women, themselves, feel qualified and interested in performing.
The techniques of multidimensional scaling and cluster analysis
are useful tools In accomplishing this research.
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Further research needs to be done in the area of combat
neurosis and the relation to women. The progress of combat
neurosis in men has been fairly well documented and drop-out
rates have been established for many different types of combat
units, e.g.
,
paratroopers, tank: units, and infantry [Ref. 2l] .
The variables involved in these differing units need to be
explored and inferences about women drawn, if possible.
It is further recommended that infantry units be integrated
sexually only with extreme caution, if at all. The research
reviewed by this thesis has indicated that men differ from women
in several areas that seem to be strongly related to success in
combat. Research has indicated that gender-integrated work
groups differ in some ways from single-sex work groups, and it
can be expected that integrated military units will differ from
segregated units also. Integrated units may differ in ways that
sharply reduce combat effectiveness. It is suspected that
wholesale introduction of women into infantry units, without
changes to training and doctrine would, in fact, serve to reduce
combat effectiveness. At the very least, introducing women into
the infantry would add a measure of uncertainty about the combat
effectiveness of the ground forces.
Such effects might be reduced or even eliminated by proper
training and utilization of infantry personnel. Thus, it is
also recommended that research be done to determine what training
and doctrinal changes, if any, may be reauired. If sexual inte-
gration of combat units is forced on the ground combat forces by
court order or by law, then steps must be taken to utilize women
properly and to maximize the effectiveness of the combat forces.
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Finally, it is recommended that the ground forces take steps
to increase unit cohesiveness and insure unit loyalty -- regardless
of whether women are incorporated. The disturbing trends toward
social disintegration and loss of unit loyalty reported by Gabriel
and Savage, although disputed, seem to have some basis in fact.
Enough is known about primary group relations that these trends,
if true, could be reduced by proper application of the knowledge




FIGHTER VERSUS NON-FIGHTER BEHAVIOR
I. What a Fighter Does in Combat
A. The fighter exposes himself to enemy fire more than
others in order to:
1. Provide leadership (either as a normal function or
as a replacement for the designated leader)
a. in assaults and hazardous missions
b. in getting men into good firing positions
c. in getting men to fire
d. in calming men or giving them confidence
2. Take aggressive action (exclusive of leadership role)
a. by advancing toward enemy (firing)
b. by firing effectively at enemy
c. by volunteering for and performing hazardous
missions
3. Perform supporting tasks under fire
a. such as caring for or evacuating wounded or
helping In body recovery
b. or, bringing up ammo, repairing weapon, laying
coram, wire, carrying messages
B. Under the same exposure to fire as others in the unit
the fighter :
1. Leads men effectively (either as a normal function,,
or as a replacement for the designated leader)
a. in getting them into good fighting positions,
keeping them moving
b. in getting them to fire
c. in calming them, giving them confidence, checking
them often
d. in acting generally as a leader
2. Takes aggressive action (exclusive of leadership)
a. by throwing grenades effectively
b. by firing weapon effectively
c. by volunteering for and performing hazardous duty
3. Exhibits high degree of personal responsibility
a. by being the last man to leave a position
b. by continuing on, though wounded
c. by leaving a less hazardous task to help where
needed

II. What a Non-Fighter Does in Combat
A. The non-fighter does not expose himself to more enemy
fire than do others in the unit.
B. Under the same exposure to fire as others in unit,
the non-fighter :
1. Actively withdraws or "bugs out," usually under fire
2. Withdraws psychologically
a. stays in bunker or in trench when he should be
moving
b. refuses direct order to fire at enemy
c. refuses direct order to evacuate wounded or
dead
d. refuses direct order to move from one position
to another




a. leaves, throws away, or dirties parts of his
weapon to make it inoperative
b. stops fighting when only slightly wounded
c. when he should be fighting, avoids his primary
responsibility by carrying supplies or helping
wounded buddy
d. fails to fire at good target for fear of giving
away his position
e. sick (malingering)
f. says he can't take it
g. malingering in general
4. Defensively over-reacts
a. imagines he "sees" and "hears" things; may fire
his weapon or throw grenades at them
5. Becomes hysterically incapacitated
a. trembles to such an extent that he is unable to
hold or fire his weapon, or fires wildly
b. breaks down and cries
c. shaky and nervous
Adapted from Egbert, R. L. and others, Fighter I: An Analysis
of Combat Fighters and Non-Fighters , U.S. Army Leadership Human





The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and
the California Personality Inventory (CPI) are two psychological
testing instruments. The MMPI was developed for use with abnormal
individuals while the CPI was developed for use on a normal popu-
lation. About half the items on the CPI were adapted from the
MMPI. The MMPI is by far the more used of the two, and is widely
used in clinics and as a research tool. A wide body of literature
has grown up around the MMPI.
The MMPI was originally developed in a psychiatric hospital
to distinguish among individuals suspected of suffering from
psychological disorders. It consists of 555 items which the
individual answers about himself. There are 9 different clinical
scales. Each item may contribute to one or more of the 9 scales.
The items that contribute to a particular scale are those that
differentiate a particular pathological group from a group of
normal individuals. The raw scores on each clinical scale are
converted to standard scores with a mean of 50 and a standard
deviation of 10. A graphical scale or profile is drawn up on
each individual. Attention is focused on scores over 70 as
indicating some mental imbalance or psychopathology . The original
scales include hypochondriasis, depression, paranoia as well as
others. Besides the 9 clinical scales, there are 3 verification
scales used to detect conscious or unconscious lying. Several
hundred other scales and keys have been developed over the years
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to detect other personality characteristics such as social
dominance, femininity and ego strength.
The difficulty with the use of the MMPI is that while there
is extensive documentation of the original 9 scales, there is
very little documentation of some of the other scales. Further,
much of the literature is concerned with the interpretations of
various profiles and coded profiles. Fighter I data were presented
in mean raw scores for various scales rather than as standardized
scores or profiles. Thus, comparisons with normal populations





Please circle one, and then write the number on
the line provided at the right edge of the paper
I am a : male = 1, female = 2
Rate the following list of jobs on their suitability for
women on a scale from 1 tc 7 with 1 being ideally suited and
7 being totally unsuitable. Circle each rating and write





1. Real Estate Agent
2. Undercover Policeperson
3. High Wire Performer
4. Military Radio Repairperson
5. Helicopter Crew Chief
6. Social Worker
7. Bookkeeper
8. Military Truck Driver
9. Military Dentist
10. Medic (infantry)




15. Professional Assassin (CONUS)


































































































































21. Chief of Naval Operations
22. Gran Prix Race Driver
23. Steel Mill Foreman
24. Minuteman Missile Crew Member
25. Janitor
26. Tank Mechanic
27. Used Car Salesperson
28. Spy (Overseas)





33. F-4 Radar Intercept Officer





38. Poseidon Missile Submarine
Crew Member






45. Executive Officer (Destroyer)
46. Nurse (CONUS
)

















































































































































































48. Machine Gunner (infantry)
49. Company Commander (infantry)
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